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Steven Palmer

Central American Encounters with Rockefeller
Public Health, 1914-1921

In April 1914, Costa Rica became the first Latin American state to welcome to its territory a Rockefeller Foundation program, in this case an
International Health Commission (IHe) project for the eradication of
hookworm disease. Over the following two years, anti-hookworm missions were established in Panama, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and EI Salvador.
The Rockefeller Foundation, which was created in 1913-1914 as the international extension of philanthropic work that had originated in the United
States, chose to initiate operations in these countries and in the British
Caribbean colonies. According to the foundation's official historian, this
was because, "like the West Indies, Central America offered opportunity
for a beginning in which experiments could be tried out on a small scale
and in a comparatively quiet way." Moreover, she added, "its geographical position and political relations with the United States gave the Board
an interest which it felt in no other country." 1
Ominous imperial imagery: Central America as a secret biomedical laboratory and undifferentiated zone of geopolitical importance for,
and close control by, the United States. As it transpired, however, the
foundation's anti-hookworm program in Central America became many
programs that varied widely in scope, strategy, and achievement. These
programs were sometimes appropriated, often partially rejected, and occasionally dismissed by the host societies and governments. What follows is
an analysis of the reception and transformation of the Rockefeller Foundation's public health mission in Costa Rica, and a preliminary comparison
of Costa Rica's experience with those of the other Central American republics.
In 1914 Costa Rica was a tiny country with a population of a mere
400,000. Its political economy was dangerously reliant on the export of
coffee and bananas, this latter crop produced in an enclave on the Caribbean coast overseen by the United Fruit Company. In geopolitical terms,
the country was being squeezed by the expanding power of the United
States: to the south was Panama and the U.S. canal; to the north was recently occupied Nicaragua. Precisely because of these general traits of
hyperdependency, Costa Rica's is an interesting story about the com-

312

Steven Palmer

plexity and ambiguity of the link between imperial institution and subject
polity, and about the possibilities for those subject polities to shape their
own destinies in their inevitable encounters with emissaries from the
metropole.
Many scholars of the Rockefeller Foundation's international work have
forcefully argued that its public health programs mapped and processed
peoples of the Third World in the service of U.S. imperial expansion, the
labor needs of agrarian capitalism, and the global hegemony of a style
of scientific medicine that was finding its modern institutional and commercial form in the United States. If a general view of these programs is
taken, such a characterization can hardly be disputed. Once the perspective shifts away from the grand institutional or geopolitical unities of the
Rockefeller Foundation or the United States of America-and particularly
if the experience of host countries comes into view-an entirely new set
of questions and issues is raised about the effect of these public health ventures. What other scholars have taken to be ultimate conclusions about the
Rockefeller Foundation programs are here bracketed as a given, as a point
of departure for beginning what I think are more interesting and revealing
studies on the many ways that these ventures affected political configurations and everyday life in a wide variety of Latin American settings.2
Instead of focusing on the Rockefeller Foundation itself, then, this essay
explores the extent to which some Costa Rican individuals, intellectual
groups, and institutions were able to transform the foundation's venture
into a vehicle for realizing an already existing public health project of
local making. It proceeds by calling into question a series of assumptions
and stereotypes common to the literature on the Rockefeller Foundation
programs, and on the spread of biomedical public health models in general. The essential argument is that, once the anti-hookworm mission was
successfully established in Costa Rica, it ceased to be reducible to the
ideological or institutional unity of the Rockefeller Foundation, and was
reconfigured as a vital component of a local strategy and of an institutional
matrix designed to advance social medicine; it also became the node of
a community of public health professionals with desires and allegiances
that transcended the boundaries of Rockefeller philanthropy, the nationstate, and the informal empire of the United States.
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Peripheral Precedence

Latin America occupies an awkward place in the recent proliferation of
studies on disease, medicine, and empire.3 Pointing to a dramatic imposition of alien medical models coincidental with the encroachment of
British and later US. imperial power is complicated by Latin America's
prior colonial experience of transculturation. In effect, "Western medicine" was grafted onto American healing traditions from the Conquest
onward. Scientific medicine and public health, as consolidated in Western Europe and the United States in the second half of the nineteenth
century, were not in any direct sense arms of the imperial penetration of
Latin America. Rather, this consolidation was replicated or anticipated by
political and medical leaders throughout the Americas, and was to some
extent refashioned to meet their own conditions and needs. Furthermore,
by the time of the bacteriological revolution and the triumph of professionalism, Latin America no longer had any coherent autochthonous systems,
ancient and customary, capable of waging an epistemological battle with
Western medicine that might coincide, sometimes self-consciously as in
the cases of Ayurvedic or Unani medicine in India, with anti-imperialist
dissent. Though in Latin America scientific medicine and public health
programs propelled by the germ theory were still largely confined to
cities, and were accepted by only a thin stratum of society, they were by
1914 as Latin American as anything else.4
The Rockefeller Foundation programs in Central America have been
represented by some scholars as an integral part of an asymmetrical,
overwhelming imposition of alien medical and public health models. The
most recent study of the evolution of health care in Costa Rica-rather
a good one, too, it should be said-proposes the following picture of
that process: "Two wealthy and powerful US. organizations, the United
Fruit Company and the Rockefeller Foundation, poured money, equipment, people and technological know-how into Costa Rica. In the process,
they gradually transformed the health infrastructure and dominant models
of medical care along the lines of the germ-theory model of disease etiology, using disease-eradication techniques perfected during the SpanishAmerican war." 5
This claim is simply wrong. The error can be illustrated by a brief look
at the Central American-and particularly the Costa Rican-history of
research on, and treatment of, hookworm disease. When compared to the
US. and the Rockefeller experience with the disease, the entire isthmus
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becomes an excellent example of what I have chosen to call "peripheral
precedence." Hookworm disease had been identified in EI Salvador in
1887 and in Guatemala in 1889 by a physician of German origin, Helmut
Prowe. Between 1889 and 1914, four theses had been written on the disease at the medical schools of EI Salvador and Guatemala. Although Costa
Rica had less than one hundred physicians at the turn of the century and
no medical school, it was not without an active nucleus of medical scientists, most of them trained in Western Europe, some in other parts of Latin
America, and some in the United States. As early as 1896, the patriarch of
this group (and a former president ofthe republic), Dr. Carlos Duran, along
with a research colleague, Dr. Gerardo Jimenez, had identified ancylostomiasis as endemic to certain regions of Costa Rica. Even physicians in
the Central American periphery, then, discovered hookworm disease well
before Charles Wardell Stiles in the United States and Bailey Ashford in
Puerto Rico made their "American" discoveries of the disease in 1900.6
Aside from a brief program to treat Salvadoran troops, neither the Salvadoran nor the Guatemalan governments initiated programs to combat
hookworm disease. In Costa Rica, however, on Duran's urging in 1907,
the government sponsored a tour by two ambitious young physicians, Luis
Jimenez and Carlos Alvarado. Their mandate was to determine the extent
of hookworm infection in the country, and to design a treatment strategy.
Based on their findings, in 1910 the government approved a not insignificant annual appropriation equivalent to U.S. $10,000 for the systematic
testing and treatment of the populace. By 1913, the program was responsible for the treatment of almost 20,000 sufferers annually. The Costa
Rican program actually predated the first Rockefeller campaign to treat
hookworm disease in the South of the United States, which began only in
1909, after Stiles convinced the directors of Rockefeller philanthropy that
the extent of affliction in the U.S. South warranted their concerted attention.?
In Costa Rica, the motives for undertaking this and other programs of
popular hygiene were broadly similar to those that led the Rockefeller
Foundation into the crusade against the hookworm. At the most basic
level, hygiene was yet another realm in which to educate the popular
classes in fundamental notions of reason and science. The treatment of
hookworm disease was a particularly good vehicle for this, since there
was an effective, quick, and relatively simple method of treatment, and
the rapid relief from an acutely felt illness was an excellent form of
propaganda. Obviously, a question of political economy was involved:
hookworm disease, colloquially known as cansancio ("fatigue"), was as-
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sociated with low productivity in workers. This concern, however, was
merely one element in a broader hygiene project that acquired leverage
by equating itself with the destiny of the nation, the purity of the race, the
health of the economy, and the attainment of modernity.
The state commitment to public health programs, visible from the turn
of the century onward, was advanced under the curious banner of "autoimmigration." The country's preeminent groups had long been concerned
with a historical shortage of labor power. Costa Rica also had extremely
high levels of infant mortality, due in large measure to amebic dysentery
and other parasitic afflictions. In the official nationalist rhetoric, Costa
Rica's Hispanic population had been declared homogeneous, near-white,
and racially sound. However, public health reformers were motivated by
a fear that without a therapeutic program to maximize the health of the
laboring classes, racial degeneration would occur within what they felt
was the sound (and authentically national) population group, and its "natural" growth would stagnate. A decadent people would then have to accept the further immigration of workers from population groups that had
been pronounced racially degenerate (Afro-Caribbeans, Chinese, Gypsies, Arabs, and South Asians). Thus Cleto Gonzalez Vfquez, a two-time
president (1906-1910 and 1928-1932), coined the term autoinmigraci6n
to refer to all public health ventures, because they would maximize the
endogenous growth of the populace. Juan Bautista Alberdi's famous dictim, "to govern is to populate," had been sublated by eugenic fears: to
govern was to sanitize.8
This remained very much a vanguard posture, however, promoted by a
few influential political figures and a coterie of activist reformers, but resisted by most powerful Costa Ricans as prohibitively expensive and an
intrusion of the state on domains that should remain private. Of course,
it also threatened to subordinate physicians to greater state oversight and
regulation, and the Faculty of Medicine fought or subverted the more ambitious public health initiatives. Vociferous resistance also came from the
Juntas de Caridad, semiautonomous bastions of oligarchic prestige and
economic power that administered hospitals and public relief. Nonetheless, as incipient as these modern public health ventures were in the overall scheme of things, they remind us that even in a country as marginal
as Costa Rica, the Rockefeller Foundation's international public health
work was in many respects epistemologically, and even programmatically,
redundant. This, of course, made it relatively compatible with the established projects of these vanguard sectors of Costa Rican public power.
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Imperial Blinders and Local Plans

The Rockefeller Foundation was hardly an omniscient, well-prepared imperial machine. Employees charged with setting up the program knew
nothing of the Central American discoveries of hookworm disease, and
they were equally ignorant of the extensive treatment of hookworm disease in Costa Rica. The foundation's advance man, Joseph White, was
surprised when Guatemalan and Salvadoran physicians in public health
posts informed him of the prior research on the disease in their countries,
though he remained unimpressed by their opinion that ancylostomiasis
was not a high public health priority. When he arrived in Costa Rica in
May 1914, White was even more surprised to learn of the treatment campaign there (though it appeared to him self-evident that the campaign
director, Luis Jimenez, "was by far best fitted to deal with the Commission, having been educated in Philadelphia"). White was also ignorant of
the community of medical scientists in the country, and of the alliances
and divisions that existed among them.9
This surprising lack of preparation was probably a factor of two things.
First, the foundation does not appear to have worked closely with U.S.
consular services, either before or after establishing operations in other
countries, probably in order to minimize the perception that Rockefeller
programs were an arm of U.S. foreign policy. Second, advance men like
White relied to a certain degree on information given to them by local
agents of the United Fruit Company, who, in his case, were "all personal
friends" (White was a colonel in the Marine Hospital Service, and many
United Fruit managers had also served in the Marine Corps). Indeed, in
Costa Rica he even used the local general manager of the United Fruit
Company to act as a conduit in extending the official Rockefeller Foundation offer to the country's minister of the interior, though this corporate
cooperation later foundered, as we will shortly see. The United Fruit
Company officials do not seem to have had any great insight into local
public health efforts, perhaps because they had their own medical section
that mostly confined itself to treating employees in the enclaves.lO
Costa Rican politicians and public health activists, on the other hand,
had a fairly good idea of what to expect from the Rockefeller Foundation's
International Health Commission. Many physicians had been trained in
the United States and maintained professional contacts there. Indeed, one
Costa Rican physician and member of the political elite, Juan Ulloa, had
been on the board of the International Sanitary Bureau of the Union of
the American Republics since its creation in 1902. The bureau was more
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a network of information exchange than a programmatic agency, but it allowed delegates to become acquainted with the budding imperial health
apparatus of the United States (the head of the Sanitary Bureau was the
surgeon general of the United States). The bureau's 1909 conference was
held in San Jose, where public health officials from allover Latin America
met with the local community of activist physicians (Luis Jimenez and
Carlos Alvarado presented a report on their anti-hookworm work). Costa
Rican public health activists had had time to observe and to measure this
colossus, and when the Rockefeller men came calling, they knew whom
they were dealing with.H
Moreover, by 1914 anti-imperialist skepticism and resistance had become a significant and even acceptable part of Costa Rican political culture. The president of the republic at the moment of acceptance of the
Rockefeller offer was Ricardo Jimenez, who had been widely applauded
as recently as 1907-1908 for his nationalist denunciations of the United
Fruit Company. The incoming president, Alfredo Gonzalez Flores, would
reveal himself to be an outspoken critic of the corruption of the political
class by foreign capitalists, and of laissez-faire in general. He would actually take steps against both, actions that led to his ouster in the military
coup of 1917.'2
Anti-imperialist hostility was hardly discreet. It was one of the first
things felt by Louis Schapiro, the director of the hookworm mission, on
arriving in Costa Rica. In justifying to his superiors a decision to omit the
name of the Rockefeller Foundation from the Departamento de Ankylostomiasis's official stationery, he noted, "I thought, with the feeling against
the United States in this country, that the work would be better received
by merely mentioning the International Health Commission in conjunction with the Government. There is a national suspicion of anything done
by American Institutes, especially when the work is carried on free." 13
That the Gonzalez Flores regime came to welcome and to work with the
Rockefeller mission had a great deal to do with Schapiro himself. It also
had to do with the credentials of one Costa Rican in particular, Solon
Nunez, who was appointed by the government to work with the antihookworm department.

Double Agents and the Republic of Rational Health

The first man sent down to Costa Rica to direct the anti-hookworm mission, Henry Carter, had little success cracking the local establishment, one
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of the reasons that he left for another job after six months. His replacement
was Louis Schapiro. The son of Polish Jews who had immigrated to the
United States, Schapiro was hardly the typical "ugly American," despite
the fact that his background as a physician included service in the military and the Coast Guard, and three years as a senior public health official
in the occupied Philippines from 19IO to 1913. Schapiro had learned to
speak Spanish quite well and, according to Victor Heiser, who had been
his superior in the Philippines, had "demonstrated very unusual executive
ability" and "unusual tact in getting along with all classes of people." For
two years prior to arriving in Costa Rica, he had worked in the public
health department of Milwaukee and as a specialist in hygiene and tropical medicine at Marquette University. Judith Walzer Leavitt has described
the exceptional success of public health reformers in making Milwaukee
known, by the second decade of this century, as "the healthiest city" in
the United States. Schapiro's tenure there followed the brief socialist incumbency in the city council that had consolidated a model of broad community mobilization in public health. It was the product of a left-liberal
coalition designed to defeat traditional politicians who had preyed on the
rapid growth of the city while impeding public health initiatives.14
Even as Schapiro began organizing the anti-hookworm units in Costa
Rica, he became intrigued by the possibility of using the public education system as the matrix of popular hygiene mobilization. He may have
been the object of some calculated flattery in this regard. In April, when
his assistant director, Carlos Pupo Perez, gave a public conference on
the hookworm for schoolteachers in San Jose and the vicinity, Schapiro
was enthused by the large turnout of 174 teachers, indicating that school
inspectors had done a very efficient job of publicizing the event (or of
suggesting the costs of absenteeism). This was followed soon after by an
official offer to Schapiro from the president and his brother, the minister
of education, Luis Felipe Gonzalez Flores, to organize and direct a Department of School Health.ls
Without consulting his superiors, Schapiro accepted the post, since he
thought it would "make my position here a great deal stronger, as through
the Presidential Decree, all official doctors automatically come under the
control of this office." A bit sheepishly, he insisted that "as soon as they
can obtain a competent Costa Rican they will do so." On 2 June he concluded a report to the second in command of the IRe, John Ferrell, "I
am deriving a great deal of personal pleasure and find that my position
officially has been greatly strengthened by my acceptance of the Directorship of the Departamento de Sanidad Escolar." Indeed it had been: on
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22 May, probably under pressure from the government, the extremely exclusionary Faculty of Medicine of Costa Rica had recognized him as an
honorary member (his predecessor, Carter, had complained that doctors
were "a close corporation, and do all they can to keep outsiders out of
the Country"). Schapiro had impressed the Costa Ricans as approachable,
competent, and flexible enough to be asked to oversee a local project long
in the making.'6
Well before the arrival of the foundation, Costa Rican health reformers had planned to piggyback the system onto the highly successful public
education network, the cornerstone of the ethical state built by the Liberal
reformers of the 1880s. In the words of Pupo Perez, words that played on
the old battle cry of the educational reform, this would inaugurate "the era
of free and obligatory hygiene." 17 The central obstacle to this was a lack
of resources, itself the product of a political class not convinced of the
need to push through the necessary budget appropriations. By mid-1915,
despite an executive that was singularly disposed to effect this reform, the
always precarious fiscal situation of the Costa Rican state was becoming
ever more bleak with the onset of the wartime recession. Schapiro was
willing to take responsibility for the Rockefeller Foundation filling the
void and acting as the vehicle for realizing the project.
Obviously, this hardly made him a Kurtz figure, gone "native" and
no longer responsive to the imperial program. The large measure of autonomy that the foundation accorded local directors was in no small measure responsible for the wide variety of Latin American encounters with
Rockefeller public health. The scope of improvisation granted to a director was particularly wide given the "demonstration model" promoted by
the foundation, whereby technical and institutional frameworks would be
established in the host country, and then "transplanted" through a gradual transferral of fiscal and administrative responsibility to the host state.IS
The uses a director made of his autonomy were not likely to be questioned if they could be justified as necessary for successfully making the
transplant take root in the host body. They would be questioned even less
when, as in the case of Schapiro, the paperwork flowed efficiently, and the
end result was such an obvious fulfillment of the mission's basic mandate.
Still, it would be rash to discount the degree to which the cultural flexibility of individual directors determined the shape of different missions,
and Schapiro was obviously more flexible than most in this respect. His
sensitivity to host cultures was further revealed in the mid-1920s in Siam.
The Rockefeller Foundation was expelled by the Thai government owing
to a feeling that the organization was making the country walk down a
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path its government did not want to tread. They permitted only one agent
to stay; it was Schapiro who, according to Heiser, had volunteered for the
"thankless task," and who became "a tremendous favourite in Siam," able
to engage in ambitious sanitary engineering projects, and to establish a
series of health centers before he died there of a terminal illness,19 I would
suggest that we might understand Schapiro as a kind of double agent, advancing the interests of "imperial medicine," but as far as possible on the
terms of those sectors of the host country's political class he considered
progressive.
Schapiro soon acquired a Costa Rican partner in this double game: Solon Nunez, a young physician appointed by the government to be the
assistant director of the Sanitary Department of Schools in 1916. A year
later he was appointed the subdirector of the Departamento de Ankylostomiasis by Schapiro. Nunez was the key Costa Rican in the seven-year
direct Rockefeller involvement, and subsequently became undersecretary
of public health in 1922, and then secretary of the new Ministry of Public Health and Social Protection in 1927. His background is worth some
comment, since it also brushes against the grain of the stereotypical local
"collaborator" central to the assumptions of dependency theory and of
proponents of cultural imperialism.
Prior to 1913, when he departed to study medicine in Geneva, Nunez
was a high-profile member of a group of embittered young dissident intellectuals who had dedicated themselves to the cause of anti-imperialism
and social justice. Often teachers in the country's leading schools, and
grouped around radical periodicals and cultural centers for workers, this
loosely affiliated network included many of Costa Rica's most inspired
leftist intellectuals, like Joaquin Garcia Monge and Carmen Lyra. Nunez
had been a teacher in two rural schools, and then a school inspector, all
the while increasing his profile as a critic of dominant society by taking
an active role in publications like Aurora (1908) and Cultura (1910). His
19II essay in Renovaci6n, "Jesus y Tostoi," is considered a classic expression of the romantic anarchist and social Christian vision that animated
the project of this generation of acratas (disaffected ones).20
It is unlikely that Nunez had lost his anti-imperialist principles by the
time he returned from his studies in Switzerland and his apprenticeship
on the battlefields of France. It was clear to him, however, and to many
other progressives of the day, that there was a difference between, say,
the Departamento de Ankylostomiasis and the building of a U.S. canal or
the annexation of the country. Direct Rockefeller control was designed
to phase itself out by 1921, whereupon the state would assume complete
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control over the operations. The basic Rockefeller public health plan was
quite compatible with that proposed by Costa Rican reformers, particularly given Schapiro's willingness to integrate the mission with the school
system. The entire project promised a way of circumventing the obstacles
thrown up by the retrograde elements of the medical and political establishments, and thus represented a possible shortcut to a centralized apparatus of public health that Nunez very much conceived as a socialist advance
over laissez-faire. A Faustian bargain? Some said so, and Nunez caught his
share of criticism for devoting himself to the mission. He never hesitated,
however, and vociferously defended Schapiro on more than one occasion,
insisting that the foreign physician was a great Costa Rican patriot,21
Ironically, then, like many of his generation who had nourished themselves on the works of the great anarchists, Nunez's energies were now
turned toward imaginative leadership in expanding the role of the state.
This was especially the case after 1914, when the young Gonzalez Flores
brothers opened the doors of state patronage positions to this brilliant
generation. Its members had a sense that, if they played their cards right,
they would find themselves at the social controls when the transplant was
fully integrated into the local system. In many respects, this process was
similar to the incorporation of progressive intellectuals into state reformism in the United States (and indeed throughout the world) at this timeproponents of social medicine like Louis Schapiro, for example.
In an important sense, however, Schapiro and Nunez were "triple
agents," and their ultimate allegiance was not to an imperial institution,
a nation-state, an agroexport bourgeoisie, or an embryonic, U.S.-based
medical-industrial complex. Their bond and their behavior might best be
understood as the result of a mutual feeling that they were citizens of a
more transcendent political community: what we will call the "Republic of Rational Health," a sort of latter-day, specialist analogue of the
seventeenth-century Republic of Letters. This republic, too, was universalist and devoted to the accumulation of systematic knowledge; its ideal
was the maximization of human vitality through the application of that
knowledge. This was a commitment to public health in the full sense of
the term, since it was not bounded by any institutional borders, nor even
by the nation-state: it was an identification with humanity as a whole.
Nunez and Schapiro were pioneers of an international network of public health institutions staffed by bureaucrat-intellectuals, very much the
first generation of the transnational, bureaucratic-intellectual, global elite
with which we are increasingly familiar (and one that encompasses the
functionaries of nongovernmental organizations as well). Though both
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were surely aware that this network had been engendered by the capital
of robber barons, the imperial dreams of great powers, and the needs of
commerce and industry-and remained somehow in their service-both
also knew that the Republic of Rational Health was not reducible to them.
The international career in social medicine had its own logic, and it was
propelled by its own desire.22

The Campaigns

Both Lynn Morgan and Juan Cesar Garcia propose that the anti-hookworm
campaigns targeted coffee pickers and plantation workers in Costa Rica,
and that they were coordinated with the United Fruit Company's medical apparatus and the coffee oligarchy. In fact, no such direct relationship
existed between the program's organization and the immediate needs of
foreign or local agrarian capital. In the first year of operations, for example, campaigns were undertaken in extremely isolated peasant communities in Guanacaste and Puntarenas, and in the public schools in San Jose,
as well as along the Pacific littoral and in coffee-growing regions of the
Central Valley. The country was broken down into a grid and systematically worked through, with the intention to test and, if necessary, to treat
every individual in the area. Neither the schedule nor the method were determined by the nature of agricultural production in the region, although
communities could hasten the arrival of the anquilostomiasis unit by petitioning for it and promising assistance up front. As for the United Fruit
Company, when a hookworm unit inaugurated its campaign in the province of Lim6n in June 1915, Schapiro complained to his superiors in New
York that "the showing by the officials of the United Fruit Company was
not that of co-operation." Schapiro only made headway in the area after
meeting the governor and principal officials, the Roman Catholic priest,
and the British consul to Costa Rica, who called together and secured the
cooperation of the "colored ministers." 23
Even had the United Fruit Company been cooperative in the one part of
the country where it held sway (and which accounted for only a tenth of
the Costa Rican populace), such complex coalition weaving would have
been necessary there and elsewhere. Especially in the countryside, the
anti-hookworm campaign was a kind of guerrilla war between the culture
of progress and a wide variety of local cultural configurations. The greatest political resistance came from gamonales loathe to impose the costs
of latrine building on peasants, lest it lead them to lose influence to rival

Central American Encounters 323
political bosses. The greatest ideological resistance came from the local
empirics and curanderos, clearly perceiving the arrival of a previously
distant rival. Nonetheless, it is probably best to steer clear of romanticizing this resistance as a pure emanation of organic healing traditions
under the calculated onslaught of imperial biomedicine. Herbal, spiritual, and traditional healers were merely one end of the spectrum of rural
healers, which included the corner-store owner who carried on a lucrative
trade prescribing foreign patent medicines for "diseases of the blood,"
the traveling homeopathic salesman, and even, eventually, members of
the local community who had been hired on as microscopists during the
campaign. It is also interesting to note that the most valuable allies of
the anti-hookworm units in the rural areas were primary-school teachers,
most of them women. This crucial stratum of popular female progressivism seemed to accept with gusto a mission of hygiene evangelism that led
them to confront local traditions and power structures.24
The Department of School Health was formally a section under the direction of the anti-hookworm program. The government provided a budget for a director, part-time physicians, and full-time sanitary assistants,
these latter recruited from the ranks of female teachers and trained in
nursing. Because the school health work was so deeply intertwined with
the propaganda activities of the anti-hookworm program, the foundation's
resources were also employed to keep it administratively focused, and to
subsidize its constant work with teachers, which included periodic training sessions and the supply of literature and classroom materials. As well
as providing free diagnosis and prescription medicine to poor children,
the school health section was the first real social work agency in Costa
Rica, and the sanitary assistants increasingly undertook home visits rather
than simply school inspections. By 1921, it received a larger portion of the
total budget of the Departamento de Ankylostomiasis than did the actual
program for the treatment of hookworm disease.2s

Nationalism and Sovereignty

Most accounts of the dynamic between Rockefeller medicine and nationalism portray it in negative terms-that is, in terms of the nationalist
backlashes provoked by the missions in host countries. In a different
vein, Armando Solorzano has shown that in Veracruz the foundation's
anti-yellow fever work did a great deal to legitimize the revolutionary
government of Obregon, and that in its extraordinary collaboration with
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the socialist government in the Yucatan, it unwittingly paved the way for
national integration. However, the foundation's work could also have a
more intimate and complementary role in the production of the national
community.26
In 1915, Schapiro offered to make massive quantities of hygiene literature available to the Ministry of Education. The minister responded by
setting aside in the curriculum a half hour each week, "the day and the
time to be uniform throughout the Republic . . . for the instruction of
pupils from the literature furnished." The image of this simultaneous instruction recalls Benedict Anderson's analysis of the nation as a group
of people anonymous to one another, transformed into a political community through the simultaneous sharing of identical experiences. The
vehicle for these rituals need not be of creole fiber, as the employment
of this imperial literature makes perfectly clear. The material resources
and scale of the Rockefeller program made possible this concretization
of nationalist experience throughout the republic. In a more general way,
as the hygiene program became entrenched throughout the country's primary school system, the distinction between physical and moral hygiene
was blurred, and both were linked to national values. Being a good Costa
Rican became increasingly impossible unless one defecated in a latrine,
bathed once a day, and underwent scientific examination and purification
at the hands of the state. The most surreal portrait of this came from
Nufiez in 1931, when virtually every Costa Rican had been subjected to an
examination for hookworm disease at least once in his or her life. In extolling the incorporation of this ritual by the populace, he noted that there
was "a continuous stream of people to the country's laboratories in search
of having their feces examined." 27
As the state had assumed a greater burden of the cost of the Departamento de Ankylostomiasis, and as the department had proven itself to be
coordinated and effective, a succession of governments had arrogated to it
more authority over public health matters. On the other hand, the Faculty
of Medicine and the Superior Council of Public Health, an ad hoc advisory
body dominated by members of the medical and charity establishments,
had lost a good deal of public confidence and prestige, especially in the
wake of a chaotic response to the disastrous influenza pandemic of 19191920, which claimed the lives of over 2,000 Costa Ricans. In 1920, on
the eve of the Costa Rican state assuming financial responsibility and administrative control over the Departamento de Ankylostomiasis, Schapiro
and Nufiez met with the cabinet of the new Acosta government, which
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had succeeded the overthrown military dictatorship of the Tinocos. They
struck a secret deal to transform the Departamento de Ankylostomiasis
into the Sub secretariat of Hygiene and Public Health, with Nunez at the
helm. The parties agreed on what legislation would be necessary, since
it meant suppressing the jurisdiction legally bestowed on the Faculty of
Medicine. In return, Schapiro guaranteed further Rockefeller support for
a public health laboratory in San Jose, the training of personnel, and other
pilot projects. Thus, the moment of greatest Rockefeller subversion of
Costa Rican sovereignty was also the moment that guaranteed the state
jurisdiction over a hitherto unconsolidated domain.28

Central American Comparisons

My understanding of the anti-hookworm work in Guatemala, Panama,
Nicaragua, and El Salvador is based on much more cursory evidence than
my assessment of the Costa Rican program. It is clear, however, that work
in these other four countries came nowhere near the extent of coverage
achieved by Rockefeller-sponsored work in Costa Rica, even in absolute
numerical terms. By 1921, the Costa Rican mission had examined 277,000
individuals (70 percent of the populace), inspected almost 50,000 homes,
and overseen the building of 16,000 latrines. In Nicaragua, EI Salvador, and Guatemala, only about 150,000 individuals in each country had
been examined (25, 8, and 8 percent of the populace respectively), 15,000
homes had been inspected, and 3,000 privies had been built. The principal
ingredient for the success of the work in Costa Rica-an extensive public
education system - was absent elsewhere in Central America. The importance of this is reflected in the fact that the figures on the use of school
infrastructure and literacy by the Costa Rican mission dwarf the extent
of such work carried on by its Central American counterparts. By 1921
almost 1,000 hygiene lectures for children had been given in Costa Rican
public schools, less than 200 in Guatemala, and less than 50 in EI Salvador. Almost 300,000 units of literature had been distributed in Costa Rica,
and less than 70,000 each in Guatemala and EI Salvador, despite the fact
that their populations were five times greater than that of Costa Rica.29
Furthermore, the mission directors in the other countries were unable to
transform their institutions into nuclei of national departments of health.
Neither was there any sign of strategic alliances between progressive sectors of the local intelligentsia and the Rockefeller missions of the kind so
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crucial to the Costa Rican encounter. Corresponding to this is a sense that
the missions were never able to trade in their public image as foreign (and
thus suspect) entities for a more functional national costume.
It is striking that the greater the influence of the United States within a
country, the less successful was the public health work undertaken there
by the imperial philanthropic institution. Although I have no figures on
the Panama program, it is clear from reports that the mission was considered a failure, essentially because there was no local public health
apparatus with which to work. The US. canal authorities had jurisdiction
over public health in Colon and Panama City, and their primary efforts
went toward eradicating yellow fever and maintaining potable water. The
canal authorities were not interested in anti-hookworm work in rural or
urban areas, and the Panamanian government was not interested in investing money or personnel in the Rockefeller project as long as control over
public health matters was primarily in US. hands.30
In Nicaragua, the other satellite of the United States, the situation was
not much better in terms of the insinuation of the mission into the local
public health apparatus. The second director in particular, Daniel Molloy,
carried out an ambitious campaign in the most populous parts of the country, and seems to have had some success in gaining popular acceptance of
the mission's work, most notably among the indigenous people of Matagalpa. Support at the level of government, the medical establishment, or
social reformers, however, was never forthcoming. The country's historic
division between the ruling groups of Leon and Granada was reproduced
at the level of medicine and public health, each city having its own medical school, and the central government recognizing two national boards of
health (one from each domain of power). Neither group appeared particularly interested in assisting the anti-hookworm work, nor did the central
government itself. In fact there is frequent mention of outright sabotage
of the mission's work by these groups, and of campaigns to ensure that the
mission be equated with the US. presence in the country.3!
In Guatemala-and again despite close ties between Manuel Estrada
Cabrera and the US. government - the mission got a frosty reception from
El Senor Presidente and the local medical establishment. It also seems to
have been the most ineptly run foundation project in Central America.
With almost no government assistance, and with unambitious leadership,
the anti-hookworm work was confined almost entirely to the agroexport
plantations of the southern piedmont and coastal plain. Certain large
planters agreed to assist the mission's work on their properties, and to
undertake the construction of privies, in an attempt to improve labor out-
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put. Only in EI Salvador did the anti-hookworm program (which did not
start until 1916) eventually acquire the kind of momentum to suggest that
it might have eventually rivaled the Costa Rican campaign's coverage.
Although it is impossible to determine why this was so from the scant information I have available, it is worth speculating that it corresponds to
the existence there of a network of positivist reformers who would become visible during the popular political mobilizations of the 1920S.32

Conclusion

This brief assessment of the Central American experience with hookworm
disease and with the Rockefeller Foundation suggests some of the ways
that rethinking the imperial encounter from a local perspective can upset
entrenched assumptions. The Central American periphery actually preceded the U.S. metropole in research on, and treatment of, hookworm disease. In Costa Rica, this peripheral precedence meant that key sectors of
the government and public health community were more knowledgeable
about what the Rockefeller-sponsored hookworm program could offer the
country than was the foundation itself, and the Costa Ricans appropriated
the mission accordingly. Paradoxically, while impinging on Costa Rican
sovereignty in important ways, the foundation's presence strengthened
and expanded the reach of the Costa Rican state, and provided resources
and methods that made more profound the sense of nation among the
people of the country. Finally, a comparison with anti-hookworm work in
other parts of Central America suggests that there was no positive correlation between direct U.S. geopolitical influence and the realization of the
Rockefeller Foundation's imperial public health mission.
The Costa Rican campaign was the only case in Latin America where
the hookworm work lived up to its original goal of acting as a catalyst for
creating a centralized state agency of public health. In his 1921 summary
of the Costa Rican program, Schapiro insisted that "the organization and
direction of the Department of Medical Inspection of Schools ... was the
first step to centralize public health agencies towards the formation of the
National Health Department." That is to say, it was the drastic modification of the original Rockefeller plan, one initiated by the Costa Rican state
and made possible by Schapiro's predisposition and autonomy of action,
that led to the "success" ofthe mission. 33
There is no doubt that in the anti-hookworm mission the resources and
prestige of the Rockefeller Foundation were employed to extend the in-
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fluence of the United States, and even to tamper with Costa Rican sovereignty. Neither is there any doubt that this was part of an imperial plan to
expand the network of propaganda for centralized public health systems,
and to promote the idea of curative medicine alongside a more preventive
model. My presentation of the program also raises the specter of issues
that bedevil contemporary Latin America: the transplantation to Central America of personnel originally trained as part of Southeast Asian
counterinsurgency exercises (i.e., the Philippines); and the creation of a
parallel state, whereby institutions under the direction of U.S. personnel
are inserted into the state apparatus of the subject country. Even the foundation's planned withdrawal, and its insistence that the host states assume
the financial burden and direction of the programs, inevitably recalls more
recent imperial desires of "Vietnarnizing the conflict" and of "winning
hearts and minds." 34
Beside these troubling issues, however, is the argument I have presented
here, that the Costa Rican state was able to meld the anti-hookworm program with its own prior public health designs, redirecting the foundation's
narrowly focused original energies into a hygienicist boost of the public
education system. In a time of fiscal crisis, the resources of the empire
were harnessed to expand the sway of the state and to extend Costa Rican
nationalism among the rural populace. The anti-hookworm commission
was quite willing to ally itself with some of Costa Rica's leading antiimperialists, and the disposition of Louis Schapiro enhanced its ability to
do so. The funds and personnel of the foundation also helped overwhelm
influential sectors and institutions of the political, commercial, and medical establishments who were otherwise opposed to the statist social policy
then being advocated by a vanguard of public health reformers.

Notes

The author would like to thank Marcos Cueto, Ricardo Salvatore, Catherine
LeGrand, Warwick Anderson, Ivan Molina, and Stuart Schwartz for their assistance in refining this work. The author acknowledges the support of the Social
Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, and of the Vicerectorfa de
Investigacion of the Universidad de Costa Rica, which made parts of this paper
possible.
1. Catherine Lewerth, "Source Book for a History of the Rockefeller Foundation," vol. 2, Rockefeller Foundation Archives (hereafter RAe), 1949, 4II.
2. A recent collection on the encounter of the Rockefeller Foundation with
Latin America, taking the foundation as its principal object of analysis, is Marcos

Central American Encounters 329
Cueto, ed., Missionaries of Science: The Rockefeller Foundation in Latin America
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, I994). The collection successfully goes
beyond the often simplistic anti-imperialist, anticapitalist indictments that characterized the work of an earlier generation of students of U.S. philanthropy: in particular, Edward H. Berman, The Influence of the Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller
Foundations on American Foreign Policy: The Ideology of Philanthropy (Albany:
State University of New York Press, I983); and E. Richard Brown, Rockefeller
Medicine Men: Medicine and Capitalism in America (Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of California Press, I979); for a more recent example, see Soma Hewa,
"The Hookworm Epidemic on the Plantations in Colonial Sri Lanka," Medical
History 38, no. I (Jan. I994): I67-83. Two studies that broke the mold through
more sensitive readings of the philanthropy's activities are Mary Brown Bullock,
An American Transplant: The Rockefeller Foundation and Peking Union Medical
College (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, I980); and
John Ettling, The Germ of Laziness: Rockefeller Philanthropy and Public Health in
the New South (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, I98I).
3. For example, David Arnold's I988 review essay of the state of studies of disease, medicine, and empire begins with a brief overview of the historiography
treating Europe and North America in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and
then explains that "the rest of the world has come increasingly under scrutiny as
well," listing Africa, South and Southeast Asia, the Pacific region, and Australasia, but omitting Latin America. Though he does mention some specific cases
from Latin America later on, they do not warrant a categorical mention, and the
collection is without a Latin American case study. "Introduction: Disease, Medicine, and Empire," in Imperial Medicine and Indigenous Societies, ed. Arnold
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, I988), I. Studies of Latin America are
also absent from another important collection on this subject, Roy Macleod and
Milton Lewis, eds., Disease, Medicine, and Empire: Perspectives on Western Medicine and the Experience of European Expansion (New York: Routledge, I988).
The fact that the Philippines under U.S. occupation receives attention in both collections underlines the point.
4. Guenter B. Risse, "Medicine in New Spain," in Medicine in the New World,
ed. Ronald L. Numbers (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, I987); George
M. Foster, "On the Origin of Humoral Medicine in Latin America," Medical
Anthropology Quarterly I, no. 4 (Dec. I987): 364-66; Poonam Bala, "State and
Indigenous Medicine in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Bengal, I800-I947"
(Ph.D. diss., University of Edinburgh, I987); and David Arnold, "Smallpox and
Colonial Medicine in Nineteenth-Century India," Imperial Medicine, 47.
5. Lynn Morgan, Community Participation in Public Health: The Politics of Primary Care in Costa Rica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, I993), 17-I8.
This point of view is echoed by Juan Cesar Garcia, Pensamiento social en salud en
America Latina (Mexico: Interamericana McGraw HilljOrganizaci6n Panamericana de Salud, I994), II2-I3; and by Jorge Cayetano Mora Aguero, Las Jun-

330 Steven Palmer
tas Progresistas: Organizacion comunal autonoma costarricense, 1921-1980 (San
Jose: Editorial PEC91, 1991), 23-24.
6. On the Central American discoveries, see Solon Nufiez, "La Ankylostomiasis," Boletln de la Subsecretarfa de Higiene y Salud Publica I, no. I (May 1923):
II - IS. Some of the theses are listed in Francisco Asturias, Historia de la medicina
en Guatemala, 2d ed. (1902; Guatemala: Editorial Universitaria, 1958), 242-53,
431-34. On the numbers of physicians in Costa Rica, see Luis DobIes Segreda,
Indice bibliografico de Costa Rica, vol. 9, Higiene y medicina (San Jose: Imprenta
Lehmann, 1927-1936; and Asociacion Costarricense de Bibliotecarios, 1967),
384-402. On Ashford and Stiles, see Ettling, The Germ of Laziness, 29-32.
7. For Duran's 1907 proposal, see Archivo Nacional de Costa Rica, Policia,
977. For a summary of the initial Costa Rican campaign, see "Jimenez to White,"
28 May 1914, RAe, Record Group (RG) 5, Series (s) 1.2, box (B) 6, folder (F) 87.
On Stiles's efforts, see Ettling, The Germ of Laziness, 38-43. The Colombian case
is an interesting halfway point in this respect, with local physicians identifying the
disease in 1905 and pressing the government to initiate a dispensary campaign to
treat laborers in the sugar and coffee sectors, though with limited success (systematic Rockefeller Foundation efforts against hookworm began there in 1920). See
Christopher Abel, "External Philanthropy and Domestic Change in Colombian
Health Care: The Role of the Rockefeller Foundation, ca. 1920-1950," Hispanic
American Historical Review 75, no. 3 (1995): 350-51. Julyan G. Peard discusses
earlier Brazilian efforts to diagnose and treat hookworm in a pioneering article
on Brazilian social medicine, "Tropical Disorders and the Forging of a Brazilian Medical Identity, 1860-1890," Hispanic American Historical Review 77, no. I
(1997): 1-44·
8. Steven Palmer, "Hacia la auto-immigracion: EI nacionalismo oficial en Costa
Rica (1870-1930)," in Identidades nacionales y estado moderno en Centroamerica,
ed. Arturo Taracena and Jean Piel (San Jose: Editorial Universidad de Costa Rica,
1995), 75-85.
9. On Guatemala, "White to Rose," 7 Apr. 1914; on EI Salvador, "Report from
Dr. P. A. Villacorta," appended to "White to Rose," 25 May 1914; and on Costa
Rica, "White to Rose," 25 May 1914; all in RAe, RG 5, s 1.2, B 6, F 86 and F 87.
10. "White to Rose," 3 June 1914; and "Alvaradez [sic] to White," 14 Apr. 1914;
in RAe, RG 5, S 1.2, B 6, F 86 and F 87.
II. Norman Howard-Jones, The Pan American Health Organization: Origins and
Evolution (Geneva: World Health Organization, 1981), 8-13. The results of the
San Jose conference were published as Actas de la Cuarta Conferencia Sanitaria
Internacional de las Republicas Americanas (Washington, D.C.: Union Panamericana, 1910), but the International Health Commission personnel had not read the
publication prior to arriving in Central America.
12. For a complex variety of reasons, the coup was not backed by the United
States, and the military regime was severely weakened by its failure to receive
Washington's blessing during its two and a half years of existence.

Central American Encounters 331
13. "Schapiro to Ferrell," 20 Apr. 1915, RAe, RG 5, s 1.2, B 7, F 106.
14. "Rose to White," 5 Oct. 1914 and 10 Oct. 1914, RAe, RG 5, s 1.2, B 6, F 88;
Luis Felipe Gonzalez Flores, Historia de la injluencia extranjera en el desenvolvimiento educacional y cient(fico de Costa Rica (San Jose: Editorial Costa Rica,
1976), 160; and Judith Walzer Leavitt, The Healthiest City: Milwaukee and the
Politics of Health Reform (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982).
15. "Schapiro to Ferrell," 22 Apr. 1915, RAe, RG 5, S 1.2, B 7, F 106; and "Luis
Felipe Gonzalez Flores to Schapiro," 7 May 1915, RAe, RG 5, S 1.2, B 7, F 106.
16. "Schapiro to Ferrell," 7 May 1915; "Schapiro to Ferrell," 2 June 1915; and
"Schapiro to Ferrell," 22 May 1915; all in RAe, RG 5, S 1.2, B 7, F 106. See also
"Carter to Ernst Meyer," 13 July 1914, RAe, RG 5, S 1.2, B 6, F 96.
17. Carlos Pupo Perez, Nuestras enfermedades evitables: Principios de higiene
que nadie debe ignorar (San Jose: Imprenta Alsina, 1913),4.
18. A good overview of the "demonstration model" can be found in Abel, "External Philanthropy and Domestic Change," 341.
19. Victor Heiser, An American Doctor's Odyssey (New York: W. W. Norton,
1936 ),501.
20. Juan Bautista Frutos Verdesia, Dr. Solon Nunez Frutos (San Jose: Ministerio de Cultura, Juventud y Deportes, 1979), provides a basic biography and a

selection of his writings; the importance of his youthful anarchism is discussed
in Alvaro Quesada Soto, La voz desgarrada: La crisis del discurso o/igdrquico y
la narrativa costarricense, 1917-1919 (San Jose: Editorial de la Universidad de
Costa Rica, 1988), 167-68.
21. For a defense of Schapiro by NUfiez, see Memoria de la Secretaria de Salubridad Publica y Protecci6n Social: 1927 (San Jose: Imprenta Nacional' 1928), xi.
22. My discussion of the Republic of Letters and of its relationship to Kant's
understanding of the public use of reason comes from Roger Chartier, The Cultural Origins of the French Revolution (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press,
1991), 24-27.
23. Morgan, Community Participation, 18-19, 83; and Garcia, Pensamiento social, II2-13. For a good overview of the manner in which the campaign was undertaken, see "Informe de la Sub-secretaria de Higiene y Salubridad PUblica," Memoria del Ministerio de Gobernacion y Polida: 1923 (San Jose: Imprenta Nacional,
1924), 257-81. See also "Schapiro to Ferrell," 8 July 1915, RAe, RG 5, S 1.2, B 7,
F 107.
24. On the role of teachers, see "Informe del Departamento de Ankylostomiasis, 1922," Memoria del Ministerio de Gobernacion y Polida: 1922 (San Jose:
Imprenta Nacional, 1923), 231-33.
25. This composite picture of the evolution of the Sanitary Department of

Schools has been garnered from the annual reports of the Departamento de Ankylostomiasis in the Memorias de Gobernacion y Polida, from 1915-1922. The 1921
budget information is from Dr. F. F. Russell, "Report of Inspection of Costa Rica
(1921)," RAe, RG 5, S 2, B 41, F 244, 2. For a more detailed look at the links be-

332 Steven Palmer
tween public health institutions and other nascent agencies of moral policing, see
Steven Palmer, "Confinement, Policing, and the Emergence of Social Policy in
Costa Rica," in The Birth of the Penitentiary in Latin America: Essays on Criminology, Prison Reform, and Social Control, 1840-1940, ed. Ricardo Salvatore and
Carlos Aguirre (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996).
26. Armando Solorzano, "The Rockefeller Foundation in Revolutionary Mexico: Yellow Fever in Yucatan and Veracruz," in Cueto, Missionaries of Science,
52-71. An excellent treatment of the ambiguous and unexpected manifestations of
nationalism in motivating biomedical research in Latin America is Marcos Cueto,
"Nacionalismo y ciencias medicas en el Peru," Quipu 4, no. 3 (Sept.-Dec. 1987):
327-55.
27. "Report of Quarter Ending March 31, 1915," RAe, RG 5, S 1.2, B 7, F 106;
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread
of Nationalism, 2d ed. (London: Verso, 1991), 35-36; and Memoria de Salubridad
Publica y Proteccion Social, 1931-32 (San Jose: Imprenta Nacional, 1932), 9.
28. Louis Schapiro, "Hookworm Campaign in Costa Rica (1921)," RAe, RG 5,
S 2, B 28, F 168, 2.
29. For Costa Rica, see "Informe del Departamento de Ankylostomiasis," Memoria de Gobernacion y Polida: 1921 (San Jose: Imprenta Nacional, 1922), 269,
275; for Nicaragua, "Relief and Control of Hookworm Disease in Nicaragua,"
RAe, RG 5, s 2, B 34, F 202, 20-21, 27; for EI Salvador, "Relief and Control of
Hookworm Disease in Salvador," RAe, RG 5, S 2, B 36, F 218, 12, 19, 21; and for
Guatemala, "Relief and Control of Hookworm Disease in Guatemala," RAe, RG
5, S 2, B 31, F 194, 5, 10.
30. Russell, "Report of Inspection of Costa Rica," 4; and Garcia, Pensamiento
social, II5. Symptomatic of this is that the hookworm programs receive not a
single mention in the memoirs of the Canal Zone's chief health officer during this
period: Winston P. Chamberlain, Twenty-five Years of American Medical Activity
on the Isthmus of Panama, 1904-1929: A Triumph of Preventive Medicine (Canal
Zone: Panama Canal Press, 1929).
31. "Relief and Control of Hookworm Disease in Nicaragua," 32-34; "Report
to Rose from Managua," RAe, RG 5, S 2, B 34, F 201; and Garcia, Pensamiento
social, II3.
32. "Relief and Control of Hookworm Disease in Guatemala"; and "Relief and
Control of Hookworm Disease in Salvador," 5,23-25. Garcia, Pensamiento social,
III, notes the existence of a group of state medicine intellectuals in EI Salvador as
early as the turn of the century.
33. Schapiro, "Hookworm Campaign in Costa Rica (1921)," 2.
34. In fact, U.S. medical personnel had even used the term Philippinization to
characterize their efforts to transfer to Filipinos the public health apparatus that
was so crucial a part of occupation and counterinsurgency (Warwick Anderson,
personal communication).

